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Analysis Area: 16 districts and counties of Busan Metropolitan City
Core Areas: Population migration of those in their 20s and 30s, youth employment, wages, job roles, industrial structure, university talent, housing, birth rates, and youth policy
Agenda: Does the outflow of youth from Busan stem from industrial, job, and wage structures rather than housing or welfare shortages, and are current youth policies and investments in new industries actually changing that structure?
Golden Time Type: Youth Retention Crisis + Industrial Transformation Lag
Assessment Clock: 2026–2029
Reference Date: August 28, 2026
Version: Regional AX Golden Time Intelligence v3.2 Final Assessment of Enhanced Criteria
:  Partial improvement in employment, continued outflow of those in their 20s, and unconfirmed effects of industrial transformation
 

In the first quarter of 2025, Busan experienced a net population outflow of 3,374 people , followed by 3,704 in the second quarter and 1,892 in the third quarter . The net outflow rate among those in their 20s was the highest in all quarters, and migration to Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Incheon continued. Although the scale of the net outflow in the third quarter decreased compared to the same period of the previous year, the direction of migration for the youth population remained unchanged. ( National Data Center, Population Migration in the Southeastern Region , Q1 2025; Q2 ;  Q3 2025 )

In April 2026, the youth population aged 20 to 39 in Busan was approximately 775,000 , accounting for 23.5% of the total population. The population aged 65 and older was approximately 835,000, or 25.2%, surpassing the youth population. We have reached a stage where the outflow of youth is accelerating a reversal of the age structure, moving beyond a simple population decline. ( Busan Metropolitan City Population Policy Briefing )

Employment evidence is not linear. An income-based big data analysis of Busan City showed that from 2022 to 2025, the proportion of unemployed youth decreased by 10.0 percentage points while the number of wage earners increased, and the personal income of young people who moved into the city also rose. Although some indicators of youth employment improved, the net outflow of those in their 20s continued during the same period. This confirms a structure where wages, job duties, and career paths, rather than employment status, determine mobility. ( Busan Metropolitan City )

The Busan Institute identified low wages and a lack of job diversity as the primary causes of the outflow of Busan's youth, and the issue of persistent net outflow despite increased youth budgets was also raised during the administrative audit by the Busan Metropolitan Council. A gap exists between youth support spending and changes in the industries, companies, and jobs that young people choose. ( Busan Institute , Busan Metropolitan Council )

If AX investments in ports, finance, maritime, and tourism between 2026 and 2029 do not lead to first jobs and growth roles for young people, Busan will become a city that continues to send its youth out of the city while expanding new industrial facilities.  Population policies designed to reverse the outflow of youth without industrial transformation cannot be established based on current evidence.

In April 2026, the youth population in Busan was approximately 775,000, accounting for 23.5% of the total, while the elderly population was approximately 835,000, accounting for 25.2%. The Busan Institute analyzed that the proportion of the youth population in Busan is the lowest among special and metropolitan cities.

The demographic structure has shifted from a youth-centered expansion of production and consumption to one characterized by the support of the elderly population and growing demand for medical and care services. The outflow of youth not only reduces the labor supply but simultaneously weakens the foundations for housing demand, entrepreneurship, birth rates, and local tax revenue.

Public data linking youth job roles, wages, areas of relocation, and industrial mobility by district and county along the same individual's time axis is limited. If the proportion of youth declines further over the next two to three years, failure to secure talent limits industrial transition before new corporate investment.

Busan's youth problem is not a future demographic risk, but rather the current structure where the elderly population has already surpassed the youth population.

According to an analysis by Busan City, the proportion of unemployed youth decreased by 10.0 percentage points and the number of wage earners increased from 2022 to 2025. Income stability for resident youth was also found to be higher than that of youth moving in or out.

However, in 2025, Busan recorded a net outflow in all three quarters, and the net outflow rate for those in their 20s was the highest in each quarter. It is a structure where an increase in the number of employed people and wage income does not lead to a reversal in the migration of the youth population.

Data linking the industry, company size, job function, annual salary, and length of service of wage earners with net mobility is not available. Even if short-term employment and low-growth jobs increase over the next two to three years, young people will move after employment if the potential for career expansion is low.

Busan is at a stage where young people are leaving even if youth employment improves, and the gap in the job structure is operating more significantly than the employment capacity.

In the first quarter of 2025, Busan experienced a net outflow of 2,398 people to Seoul, 1,195 to Gyeonggi, and 367 to Incheon. The net outflow toward Seoul and Gyeonggi continued in the second and third quarters as well. The structure is such that youth migration is not limited to a shift in living areas with the adjacent Gyeongnam region but connects to the corporate and job markets in the metropolitan area.

The Busan Institute cited low wages and a lack of job diversity as the main causes of brain drain. The purpose of mobility has shifted from simply seeking employment to seeking larger companies, specialized roles, higher wages, and future career opportunities.

There is no career path evidence showing which job roles and regions young people move to a few years after obtaining their first job in Busan. If the outflow following the first employment between 2026 and 2029 is not captured, employment programs will achieve employment rates while simultaneously exacerbating the brain drain.

The structure of the youth outflow in Busan is shifting from an escape by the unemployed to a movement for career growth.

Busan City's income big data showed an increase in wage earners and a decrease in the unemployed, and the net outflow of youth in the third quarter of 2025 also decreased compared to the same period of the previous year. Therefore, the judgment that the employment base has comprehensively deteriorated cannot be established.

On the other hand, the Busan Institute identified low wages and a lack of job diversity as factors limiting the settlement of young people in Busan. While the quantity of jobs is improving, the structure maintains disparities in wages, company size, and specialized job roles compared to the Seoul metropolitan area.

There is no public runtime linking regional median youth wages, employment rates at large and mid-sized companies, the proportion of professional jobs, and 3-year wage growth rates. If the gap in starting wages accumulates over 2 to 3 years, the difference in lifetime income and career assets becomes larger than the difference in housing costs.

While there is evidence of quantitative improvement in Busan's youth jobs, qualitative competitiveness has not been confirmed to be at a level sufficient to reverse the net outflow.

Busan has a large proportion of traditional service and field industries, such as ports, logistics, tourism, wholesale and retail, accommodation and food services, and ship repair. At the same time, it is expanding into future industries including AI, fintech, new marine industries, power semiconductors, biotechnology, and age tech.

While industrial policy has shifted from maintaining existing industries to focusing on technology, data, and professional services, it is unclear whether the net increase in youth employment by industry has occurred at the same pace. An outcome gap remains between the number of investment projects, centers, and clusters and the number of professional jobs for youth.

Even if new industrial facilities are established between 2026 and 2029, if research and development, headquarters, and product planning roles are assigned to companies in the Seoul metropolitan area, the roles remaining for young people in Busan will be limited to operations, sales, and field support.  While Busan's industrial transformation is in progress on the project list, the transition of the job structure for young people remains unconfirmed.

During the 2025 administrative audit by the Busan Metropolitan Council, it was confirmed that 12 out of the 37 employed participants of the customized information industry workforce training program were located in Busan. Some of the employed individuals moved to companies in the Seoul Metropolitan Area, the Chungcheong region, or neighboring areas. ( Busan Metropolitan Council )

Although the education program shifted from technical training for unemployed youth to cultivating digital talent tailored to companies, the hiring demand from Busan companies failed to absorb the trainees. This is a case where talent development functioned as a pathway for employment outside the region rather than supplying local industries.

While the employment status of training graduates has been tracked, there is a lack of public evidence continuously tracking their work location, job duties, wages, and three-year tenure. If the scale of the training is expanded over the next two to three years, digital personnel trained with Busan's budget will become a workforce supply source for industries in the metropolitan area.

While talent development in Busan is producing employment results, the retention of local talent is weak.

The Busan City Council pointed to the welfare-centered support structure as the reason for the increased net outflow of youth, despite the expansion of the youth budget and support programs in 2025. During the same period, the Busan Institute identified wages and job diversity as the main causes of the youth outflow.

While youth policy has expanded to include housing, living expenses, asset formation, and activity support, there is no evidence confirming that industrial policy’s corporate attraction, R&D, and clusters are managed in the same manner as youth settlement indicators. The performance accounts for youth policy and industrial policy are separated.

If youth policies reduce short-term living costs and industrial policies only increase facility investment for two to three years, the career opportunity gap for youth will remain unchanged.  While Busan’s population policy is lowering the cost of living for young people, it has not been determined that it has changed the industrial causes of youth leaving.

Busan has conducted a population analysis based on youth income and is also disclosing quarterly population migration data and the performance of youth policies. There is evidence that the outflow of youth has begun to be viewed in connection with income and employment, rather than simply as a decrease in registered residents.

However, longitudinal data linking an individual's education, major, first job, wages, mobility, and re-entry are not available. Performance indicators for youth policy, talent development, corporate support, and industrial investment are also separated by institution.

If the causes of mobility and career paths are not linked for 2026–2029, it cannot be determined whether the reduction in net outflow is due to economic fluctuations, population decline, or policy effects. Regarding  Busan's level of preparedness, while demographic analysis has progressed, the industry-job-mobility runtime is not yet established.

Companies at the Busan Fintech Hub recorded 147.6 billion won in revenue and 432 jobs in 2025, and support for companies in smart ship repair, marine AI, and port automation was expanded. Actual revenue and employment have begun to be generated in new industries.

However, the proportion of those in their 20s and 30s, Busan university graduates, regular employees, professional workers, and Busan residents among the employment is not confirmed. The connection between corporate growth and youth settlement is also not disclosed.

Even if sales in new industries increase over the next two to three years, the demographic effect of industrial transformation will not occur unless the hiring of local youth and experienced positions increase. While  the achievements of Busan's new industries have spread to some companies, there is no evidence that they have spread to the youth population.

Busan City has expanded support for youth housing, employment, asset formation, entrepreneurship, and cultural activities, and an income-based analysis for 2026 confirmed a decrease in the number of unemployed youth and an increase in wage earners. This is evidence that the economic activity conditions of policy targets have partially improved.

However, in 2025, there was a net outflow of people in their 20s every quarter, and the main destinations for young people were found to be Gyeongnam, Seoul, and Gyeonggi. Data comparing the retention rates of participants in support programs with those of non-participants was also not found.

If only employment and income immediately after policy participation are evaluated over the next two to three years, relocation and job changes after the termination of support are excluded from the results. While  short-term economic improvement has been confirmed for Busan's youth policy, its long-term settlement effect remains unassessed.

12-1. Centum & Munhyeon District — The Disconnect Between New Industry Growth and Youth Employment

The Centum area is home to ICT, content, and startup companies, while the Munhyeon area houses public financial institutions and a fintech hub. Revenue and employment at companies in the Busan Fintech Hub have increased, and talent development for the digital finance and information industries has continued.

However, new youth hiring, median wages, the proportion of Busan university graduates, and the three-year retention rate in the two regions are not disclosed in an integrated manner. This structure does not allow for the corporate growth and youth settlement in industrial hubs to be managed as equal outcomes.

Even if companies grow within two to three years, if high-level development, financial models, and planning roles remain in the metropolitan area organization, the Busan base will become entrenched as an operational organization.  The Centum and Munhyeon areas are employment hubs for new industries, but they were not determined to be career hubs for Busan youth.

12-2. Gangseo and Yeongdo Areas — Time Lag Between Industrial Transition and Job Transition

In the Gangseo area, automated ports, hinterland logistics, and Jinhae New Port are being expanded, while in the Yeongdo area, the Smart Ship Repair Support Center and the Ship Repair Innovation Technology Center are being operated and established. It is a structure where automation, data, and smart equipment are integrated into existing on-site industries.

However, the scale of youth hiring for existing jobs decreasing due to automation and newly emerging AI control, maintenance, and data jobs is not confirmed. There is a time lag between facility AX and labor market AX.

If automated facilities are expanded first between 2026 and 2029 without the follow-up of young technical workers, existing employment will decrease and new high-wage jobs will be taken by out-of-region suppliers. While  industrial transformation in the Gangseo and Yeongdo regions is physically underway, the transition of jobs for young people remains uncertain.

In 2026, the proportion of the youth population in Busan was 23.5%, lower than the proportion of the elderly population at 25.2%. In 2025 as well, those in their 20s and 30s experienced a net outflow, while those in their teens recorded a net inflow in some quarters.

A structure has been established where people either move to Busan for education or remain there, but leave during the stages of employment, marriage, and childbirth. This represents a gap where the functions of universities and the city as an educational hub do not translate into industrial settlement.

If the net outflow of people in their 20s and 30s continues for two to three years, the decline in births will accumulate with a longer time lag than the current decline in the youth population.  The outflow of youth from Busan has gone beyond a loss of labor force and reached a stage where the birth base for the next generation is shrinking.

The net outflow of people in their 20s from Busan continued every quarter in 2025, and the youth population is already smaller than the elderly population. Investments in new industries such as ports, finance, marine AI, and power semiconductors are at a stage where facilities and corporate ecosystems are finalized between 2026 and 2029.

However, there is no evidence linking investment in new industries with new professional roles, wages, or retention rates among Busan youth. A gap exists between the speed of population decline and the speed of youth employment generated by industrial transition.

If young people establish their first career, housing, spouse, and network in the Seoul metropolitan area, the cost of returning to Busan becomes high, even if wages and job conditions improve thereafter. Companies also deploy their R&D organizations to regions where talent is concentrated rather than to areas lacking young specialized personnel.

Busan's irreversibility lies not in the outflow of a single young person, but in the entrenched cycle where youth and businesses follow one another and accumulate outside of Busan.

AX Response Assessment: If youth policy and industrial investment are not linked to the same individual's job, wages, and travel time, the structure of talent drain cannot be assessed even if the employment rate and number of supported personnel increase.

Current Assessment: Partial improvement in youth employment, continued net outflow of those in their 20s, and unconfirmed effects of industrial transformation.

2-Year Assessment: The period in which it is determined whether investment in new industries leads to specialized jobs for youth.

3-Year Assessment: A period where the co-concentration of youth and businesses in the capital area could become entrenched as a talent shortage in Busan

Employment Assessment: Improvements were observed in employed and wage earners, but competitiveness in wages, job duties, and career paths remains unconfirmed.

Policy Assessment: Livelihood and employment support exists, but the effectiveness of eliminating industrial causes is not assessed.

Irreversibility Determination: Probability of return plummets after first career and offshore formation of family, assets, and networks

Overall Assessment: Population policies designed to reverse the net outflow of Busan's youth without industrial transformation are not feasible.

1. Net migration of Busan by age, gender, and education level
2. Scale of outflow of Busan youth to Seoul, Gyeonggi, and Gyeongnam
3. Ratio of employment, workplace, education, and housing by reason for relocation
4. Regional Retention Rate of University Entrants, Graduates, and Employed in Busan
5. Work locations after 1, 3, and 5 years of graduation
6. Busan employment rate and metropolitan area employment rate by major
7. New hiring of youth by industry and job function
8. Proportion of youth regular, non-regular, and platform workers
9. Median wage of youth by company size
10. Wage gap between Busan and the metropolitan area for the same job
11. 3-year tenure, turnover, and transfer rates at the first job
12. Busan youth employment rate of new industry investment companies
13. Number of specialized job positions for young people in ports, finance, maritime AI, and semiconductors
14. Net increase/decrease in youth entry jobs before and after automation
15. Employment and retention rates in Busan for talent development program graduates
16. Remaining employed people in Busan per 100 million won of education business
17. 3-year residency rate of youth support program participants
18. Changes in income, employment, and relocation after support ends
19. Youth Jobs and Housing Cost Burden by District/County
20. Job, income, and remaining period of young people moving into Busan
21. Return and Re-outflow Rates of Experienced Workforce in Their 30s to Busan
22. Survival, Revenue, and Headquarters Relocation of Youth Startups
23. Time lag between marriage, birth, and net migration of young adults
24. The Impact of Declining Youth Population on Corporate Investment

Even if a young person secures their first job in Busan, migration does not end unless there is a visible path for their next job and wage increase. Evidence showing that the net outflow of those in their 20s has persisted despite a decrease in the unemployed and an increase in wage earners indicates that settlement cannot be explained solely by employment status.

For young people, a region is a market for their next career rather than just the address of their current workplace. If there are limited options for moving to higher-level roles and companies within the same industry, a city cannot serve as a long-term career hub, even if a first job exists. The lack of job diversity in Busan functions as a shortage of future mobility paths rather than a shortage of current jobs.

The same applies to the structure where talent is nurtured and subsequently finds employment outside the region. While education has increased the mobility of young people, if the demand from Busan companies fails to absorb that capability, educational outcomes and regional outcomes move in opposite directions.

The unit of judgment for the outflow of youth from Busan is not how many people are employed, but how many career advancements a young person can make within Busan.